Calye's Case, 8 Coke Rep. 32 *a*; *Hall* v. *Pike*, 100 Mass. 495. See BEALE, INNKEEPERS, §§ 183–85, 188. It is equally axiomatic that the lodging-house keeper is liable only for reasonable care. *Holder* v. *Soulby*, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 254. See *Scarborough* v. *Cosgrove*, [1905] 2 K. B. 805. See also 19 HARV. L. REV. 534. The public duty and extraordinary liability of the innkeeper exist only in regard to a traveler. *Rex* v. *Luellin*, 12 Mod. 445. See Bruce Wyman, "The Inherent Limitation of the Public Service Duty to Particular Classes," 23 HARV. L. REV. 339, 340. Where an innkeeper entertains boarders as well as guests, he is nevertheless liable to the boarder only as a lodging-house keeper and not as an innkeeper. *Lamond* v. *Richard*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 541; *Manning* v. *Wells*, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 746; *Horner* v. *Harvey*, 3 N. M. 197, 5 Pac. 329; *Crapo* v. *Rockwell*. 48 Misc. 1, 94 N. Y. Supp. 1122. See BEALE, INNKEEPERS, §§ 201, 202; 2 PARSONS, CONTRACTS, 8 ed., 159. See also 10 HARV. L. REV. 519. In many cases it is a difficult question of fact to determine whether the person entertained is a guest or a boarder. The courts seem to assume that he is a guest, unless the contrary is clearly shown. *Cf. Hancock* v. *Rand*, 94 N. Y. 1, and *Shoecraft* v. *Bailey*, 25 Iowa, 553. But *cf. Meacham* v. *Galloway*, 102 Tenn. 415. In the principal case, the lease negatives the possibility of the innkeeper relation.

INTERNATIONAL LAW — CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY — EFFECT OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT. — During the revolution of General Carranza against Huerta, officers of the former, in pursuance of military orders, seized property and sold it to a United States citizen. Subsequent to the seizure, the United States government recognized Carranza's government as the *de jure* government of Mexico. This suit was brought to determine whether the purchasers from Carranza's officers acquired good title as against someone claiming under the former owner. *Held*, that good title was acquired. *Ricaud* v. *American Metal Co.*, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 312.

The acts of one sovereign state done within its own territory are not subject to review by the courts of another. *Underhill* v. *Hernandez*, 168 U. S. 250; *American Banana Co.* v. *United States Fruit Co.*, 237 U. S. 347. This principle has even been extended to acts done by a *de facto* as well as a *de jure* government. *O'Neill* v. *Central Leather Co.*, 87 N. J. L. 552, 94 Atl. 789. It belongs exclusively to the political department of the government to recognize who the sovereign of a territory is, and this recognition is absolutely binding on the courts of that government. *Jones* v. *United States*, 137 U. S. 202; *O'Neill* v. *Central Leather Co.*, *supra; State of Yucatan* v. *Argumedo*, 92 Misc. 547, 157 N. Y. Supp. 219; *United States* v. *Palmer*, 3 Wheat. (U. S.) 610; *Williams* v. *Suffolk Ins. Co.*, 13 Peters (U. S.), 415. The recognition by this government of a foreign sovereign relates back to the inception of the latter government, and makes binding in this country its acts from the beginning. *Underhill* v. *Hernandez*, *supra; State of Yucatan* v. *Argumedo*, *supra*. See *Williams* v. *Bruffy*, 96 U. S. 178, 186.

JUDGES — DISQUALIFICATION — PARTICIPATION OF DISQUALIFIED JUDGE. — In the hearing of an action to construe a statute fixing the salaries of members of the supreme court, four of the five justices withdrew in favor of four district judges. One justice participated in the determination of the cause. His presence was not necessary to constitute a quorum, nor did his vote decide the result. The state constitution provides that if a judge of the supreme court is in any way interested in a case before the court, the remaining justices shall call one of the district judges to sit with them in the hearing of that cause. (N. D. CONST. § 100.) *Held*, that the mere presence of the disqualified judge did not render the judgment void. *State ex rel. Langer* v. *Kositzky*, 166 N. W. 534 (N. D.).